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This study econometrically evaluates the short-run impact of aid in small developing 
countries (SDCs) by applying a VAR model to study aid’s impact on ‘absorption’ 
(increasing import demand) and ‘spending’ (increased domestic demand) across 
countries. Whilst our approach allows parameters to vary across countries, the focus is 
on average country effects and differential effects within certain subgroups of countries. 
In particular, we find substantial differences between ‘aid-dependent’ SDCs and other 
SDCs which are more dependent on mineral resources and financial services. In the 
latter group, aid seems to be neither absorbed nor spent in any systematic fashion. But 
in the aid-dependent SDCs, aid receipts seem to be used more in the textbook ‘absorb 
and spend’ fashion.  
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Although some aspects of small developing countries (SDCs) have been widely 
researched in the development literature, especially their structural differences to larger 
developing countries,1 relatively little is known about aid effectiveness in these 
countries.2 This is surprising given that one of the most distinctive features of SDCs is 
their high degree of ‘dependence’ upon foreign aid flows. A key objective of the present 
study is to expand our knowledge of how aid is used in these countries, albeit in a 
limited fashion. 
The limited scope of the study refers to our emphasis upon the short-run 
macroeconomic impacts of aid, rather than medium- to long-run impacts on growth or 
other aspects of development such as policies, institutions, health and education. In that 
sense our study is more related to the fiscal response literature, which uses theoretically 
motivated models to simulate the effect of aid on government expenditure, tax revenue 
and other policies, given the utility preferences of policymakers (see, for example, 
McGillivray and Morrissey 2001). A more recent literature uses an overtly historical 
(but nevertheless empirical) analysis of small sets of countries to better understand the 
absorption and spending decisions of aid recipients, where absorption is defined as 
increases in the current account deficit (i.e., net imports), and spending as increases in 
the government fiscal deficit net of aid (IMF 2005; Foster and Killick 2005). Whilst still 
in its nascency, this research has offered some interesting insights into how recipients 
might respond to a significant scaling up of aid, as mandated by the Gleneagles summit 
in 2004. And finally, our approach is methodologically most similar to recent studies 
which adopt a more atheoretical or agnostic approach to gauging the effects of aid on 
the macroeconomy. These studies use vector autoregressive (VAR) models to gauge the 
impact of aid receipts on fiscal policy in individual countries, such as Malawi (Fagernas 
and Schurich 2004), Ghana (Osei, Morrissey and Lloyd 2005) and Jordan (Saif and 
Omet 2005).  
Though related to all these branches of the macroeconomic literature, our study is 
methodologically distinctive in that although we also use the agnostic VAR approach, 
we focus our attention on a range of countries rather than a single country, and—not 
unlike the 2005 IMF study—we examine both spending and absorption responses.3 
Generally speaking, adopting a VAR approach to gauging short-run aid impacts in a 
wide range of countries would be problematic, given the arguably legitimate 
heterogeneity of aid’s short-term usage, a fact amply revealed even in the small 
numbers of countries analysed in the IMF (2005) and Foster and Killick (2005) studies. 
                                                 
1   A number of recent papers have systematically tested for differences between small and large states 
(Armstrong et al. 1998; Armstrong and Read 2002; Bertram 1993; Briguglio 1995; Collier and Dollar 
1999; Easterly and Kraay 2000; Harden 1985; Kose and Prasad 2002; Milner and Westaway 1993; 
Ramkissoon 2002; Read 2001; Streeten 1993; UN 2002). Also see Appendix B of the present paper, 
as well as earlier works in this literature which generally provide descriptive analysis and basic 
statistics (Kuznets 1960; Scitovsky 1960). 
2   In particular, there are very few cross-country studies, especially of the econometric kind, on aid 
effectiveness in SDCs. See Feeny (2007) for a recent example. There are, however, a reasonable 
number of country studies, too large in number to be adequately referenced herein. 
3   Although in the present study ‘spending’ also includes private expenditure. Fuller definitions are 
provided later. 2 
Moreover, heterogeneity in the quality of domestic policy could also confound the 
analysis, given that poor policy environments add an additional spanner to the workings 
of aid in the macroeconomy (Burnside and Dollar 2000).  
Our focus on 22 small developing countries has two advantages in this regard. First, we 
are effectively studying the short-run effects of aid in economies which are, in many 
cases, supra-open. Second, small economies—especially small island economies—are 
typically thought to have better policies and institutions than other developing 
countries.4 Of course, whilst policy quality may not be uniformly good across our 
sample, we have, in Appendix B, at least verified that this distinction mostly holds for 
the SDCs in this study. So in some sense our focus on SDCs allows us to investigate 
whether aid is used in the textbook fashion in economies that satisfy the implicit 
assumptions of that textbook prescription; i.e., good policies and institutions, including 
very high degrees of openness.  
In summary, this study has three major objectives. In addition to improving our 
knowledge of aid usage in SDCs, a second objective is to provide a new and sufficiently 
powerful econometric methodology capable of informing macroeconomic questions 
which have previously relied on case study analysis, often of a narrative fashion. The 
third and final objective is to see whether countries which are broadly possessive of 
textbook characteristics do indeed follow textbook prescriptions in their usage of aid. 
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
theoretical underpinnings of aid’s short-run effects on the macroeconomy in terms of 
absorption and spending, and distinguishes between textbook responses and the diverse 
responses observed in the IMF and Foster and Killick studies. Section 3 identifies some 
of the distinguishing features of the SDCs in question, outlines our dataset, and 
describes our econometric modelling techniques in detail. Section 4 presents our results, 
and section 5 provides some brief concluding remarks and directions for future research. 
2  A framework for analysing the short-term macroeconomic response 
to increases in foreign aid 
In this section we discuss possible scenarios of the macroeconomic management of aid 
flows. The brief summary of the special features of the small developing countries in 
comparison to other least developed countries (LDCs) above signifies that we expect the 
macroeconomic management of aid to the SDCs to be above average compared to the 
LDC group as a whole. This makes the SDCs especially interesting as aid impact 
studies. 
                                                 
4   The reasons for the relatively good socioeconomic performance of SDCs are typically thought to be 
twofold (Read 2001). First, SDCs have apparent disadvantages which could work to their advantage in 
the long run, such as extreme dependence upon the world economy, which is thought to impose the 
discipline of competition on domestic markets, and to pressure policymakers into adopting 
internationally acceptable policies and institutional structures. Second, their lack of political and 
economic importance on the international stage could mean that larger countries do not view them as 
economically threatening, and may even see SDCs as a cost-effective means of acquiring support in 
UN voting decisions (Bertram 1993). Thus, powerful countries may be more inclined to offer SDCs 
more favourable conditions on trade, offshore finance laws, migration and foreign aid, relative to 
other large LDCs.   
3 
Whilst there are a wide variety of cross-country studies intended to gauge the medium 
to long-run returns to foreign aid, as well as the effect of aid on institutions and policies, 
the literature on the short-run impact of aid on key macroeconomic aggregates is mostly 
limited to the much criticized fiscal response literature (see McGillivray and Morrissey 
2001 for a discussion). An exception to this is the 2005 IMF study, which examines the 
effects of foreign aid increases in five relatively large African countries which 
experienced substantial aid increases in the 1990s, largely as a result of significant 
institutional improvements. In the present study we follow the theoretical framework 
developed in the IMF study, but we aim at developing a more formal econometric 
technique in order to be able to focus on a larger group of countries. 
Consistent with the 2005 IMF study, Figure 1 broadly describes how recipient 
governments can use aid in the short run. Absorption is defined as the extent to which 
the non-aid current account deficit widens in response to an increase in aid inflows, or 
the extent to which direct and indirect increases in imports are financed by aid. 
Spending hereafter refers to the change in public and private expenditure. We note that 
this is a departure from the IMF and Foster and Killick (2005) studies, which define 
spending responses as increases in the fiscal deficit net of aid. This departure is chiefly 
necessary because of data constraints, although our broader definition of spending still 
permits us to make weaker inferences on the fiscal behaviour of recipient governments. 
The remaining macroeconomic aggregates are self-explanatory.  
What, then, are the different ways in which aid flows may be processed in the 
recipient’s macroeconomy? The ideal ‘textbook’ usage of aid would result in the 
domestic economy experiencing the benefits of increases in real resources—either 
increased imports, or increased domestic spending—without any substantial ‘distortion’ 
of domestic prices or the foreign exchange rate; i.e., all of the benefits, and none of the 
costs. We note that this textbook situation essentially precludes any explicit theory of 
growth, for such a theory would necessarily require a position on (among other things):  
—  whether domestic spending is to be preferred to increased imports (Hirschman 
1958);  
—  to what extend additional expenditure should fund investment versus 
consumption (De Long and Summers 1991);  
—  whether price distortions are necessarily harmful (Amsden 1989); and  
—  whether donors should really be expanding the size of LDC governments 
(Bauer 1976).  
Thus the macroeconomic framework relates more to presumed short-run welfare 
improvements rather than to faster long-run growth. 
With this caveat in mind, there are several ways in which foreign aid can increase real 
resource availability without significantly altering prices. Foreign aid is normally given 
in a foreign currency (FEX), and the standard prescription for reasonably large countries 
is that FEX aid should be mostly converted to local currency and used to increase 
government spending or decrease revenues. A potential problem with this textbook 
prescription is that the aid inflow may act to appreciate the recipient’s foreign exchange 
rate, thereby making exports less competitive, in what is known as the Dutch disease 
effect (see Young’s (1993) discussion of Ghana, for example). However, in a good 
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Figure 1 
Absorption and government spending responses to aid flows 
 
Notes:   M = Imports; nX = net exports; C = Consumption; I = Investment; FEX = foreign exchange or 
foreign exchange reserves; ER = Exchange rate; IR = Interest rate; π = inflation; LC = local 
currency. 
  Outcome 1. If aid is aid-in-kind, or if aid is entirely spent on imports by the government, then 
such aid is immediately absorbed as has no direct effects on ER or the IR (absorption and 
spending are equivalent). This outcome can also approximately be reached if aid is converted to 
local currency (leading to some appreciation) and spent on domestic goods and services which 
indirectly increase demand for imports (leading to some depreciation).  
  Outcome 2. If aid is converted to LC and spent domestically, but this domestic spending does 
not increase effective demand for imports, then this puts upward pressure on interest rates or 
exchange rates. If aid is not absorbed but spending still increases, this also puts pressure on 
interest or exchange rates and crowds out the private sector.  
  Outcome 3. If aid is neither absorbed nor spent, the FEX aid is effectively saved and used to 
build up FEX reserves. This action may be used to smooth aid flows.  
  Outcome 4. If aid is absorbed but not spent, then aid can be used to either reduce the 
government debt, or reduce the size of the current fiscal deficit. Either action may ‘crowd in’ the 
private sector. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
economic environment, aid-induced domestic spending should increase demand for 
imports, which would at least partly abate the Dutch disease effects on the exchange 
rate. Of course, in smaller economies it may be expected that most FEX aid is spent on 
imports (aid may also be given as aid-in-kind). In this scenario, one should observe 
increases in net imports as well as in domestic demand (C+I); that is, an ‘absorb and 
spend’ outcome. We also note that GDP should not significantly increase in the short 
run unless the increased investments (or institutional capacities) result in an increase in 
domestic capacity.5 In any event, both these scenarios—increased domestic spending 
                                                 
5   Recall that ‘domestic’ demand (C+I) includes imports. This double-counting is the reason that imports 
are subtracted from gross domestic product. So if C+I increases by a given amount, but net imports 
increase by the same amount, then GDP should not increase at all in this ‘absorb and spend’ scenario 
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and indirect increases in import demand, or direct use of aid on imports—yield the 
standard textbook result described by Outcome 1.  
A less favourable outcome (Outcome 2) results when aid is converted to the local 
currency and spent domestically but import demand fails to increase. If import demand 
is unresponsive to government expenditure, then one may observe a Dutch disease 
appreciation of the exchange rate, or an increase in interest rates if the exchange rate is 
pegged, since in this case the monetary authority must essentially print money to keep 
the nominal exchange rate fixed. This more adverse outcome can also come about if aid 
is not converted to the local currency and instead held as foreign exchange, but a 
spending increase is funded through printing money or increased debt. This leads to 
inflation, and is regarded by Foster and Killick (2006) as the only policy response which 
basically lacks any sound motivations (in their terminology, it breaks the only ‘golden 
rule’ of the absorption-spending mix). 
A third outcome (Outcome 3) involves no absorption and no spending. Here, aid is used 
to bolster FEX reserves or to smooth out the domestic impact of aid flows, but the 
government is prudent enough not to increase spending. This outcome may be 
appropriate if an economy is experiencing FEX shortages or excessive volatility in aid 
flows. In small open economies with undiversified exports, FEX shortages or excessive 
volatility in aid flows and other macroeconomic aggregates could be of real concern, so 
that bolstering FEX reserves may be a relatively sensible form of precautionary saving. 
On the other hand, this outcome could simply result from poor macroeconomic 
management, and FEX shortages are themselves sometimes the result of bad policies 
(e.g., taxes on exports). 
A fourth outcome (Outcome 4) involves conversion to the local currency without any 
increase in government spending. This policy would be appropriate when government 
spending is too high and is perhaps crowding out the private sector, or when 
government debt is excessive. In either scenario, this policy is capable of reducing 
interest rates and, hence, crowding in private sector investment, but it may be 
inappropriate when government debt or expenditure is not a binding constraint. Also, as 
with the case when there is local currency conversion of aid coupled with government 
spending, the effects on the macroeconomy depend on import demand. If government 
crowding out is an important constraint to effective import demand, then reducing the 
debt could have an indirect effect on imports, which would avert any Dutch disease 
effects, as in Outcome 1. However, if effective import demand is unresponsive to a 
reduction in government debt or the government deficit, then Dutch disease results 
could still occur, although the effects on domestic interest rates and inflation are 
generally ambiguous.6 
Finally, we should note that these four outcomes—and the various channels by which 
such outcomes are reached—are not mutually exclusive. Aid can be spent partly on 
imports, partly on domestic spending (with varying effects on demand for imports), 
                                                 
6  It is at least theoretically possible that government debt reduction via LCU conversion of foreign aid 
could increase private sector investment and consumption via a reduction in interest rates, but not 
much affect imports, thereby still exerting upward pressure on the exchange rate. In a fixed exchange 
rate system, the government would have to use monetary policy to counter this pressure, thereby 
putting upward pressure on interest rates. So the net effect on interest rates could be either positive or 
negative.  6 
partly used to bolster FEX reserves, and partly used to cancel debt or reduce the 
government deficit. As for the existing literature on aid absorption and spending, this 
tends to find that economies use aid in quite different ways. The 2005 IMF study of 
several relatively large African aid recipients, for example, does not find any substantial 
Dutch disease effects precisely because of recipients’ concerns over losing export 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, countries avoided Dutch disease in different ways: two 
countries—Ethiopia and Ghana—seemed to neither absorb nor spend aid, chiefly in 
order to bolster FEX reserves; Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique, on the other hand, 
spent more than they absorbed, and then attempted to cope with inflationary pressures 
through diverse monetary instruments. These results suggest that in any cross-country 
study one is likely to find considerable diversity among countries, a point of 
considerable relevance to the cross-country methodology developed in the next section. 
3  Data and methodology 
3.1  Sample selection and distinguishing features of small developing countries 
(SDCs) 
Procedurally, the first task of this study was to appropriately identify countries that are 
both ‘small’ and ‘developing’. There is a range of definitions in the literature, most of 
which are based on somewhat arbitrary criteria.7 In this study we define small 
developing countries as those with populations in 1980 of less than one million and 
incomes in 1980 of less than US$5,000 in 1990 dollars. This definition broadly matches 
the World Bank’s (IDA) criterion for small countries that require special assistance, as 
well as the commonly used criterion of the cross-country growth regressions literature, 
which typically focuses on ‘large’ countries of more than one million. Using this 
definition, and selecting countries for which a reasonable amount of data is available, 
we were initially able to construct a sample of 33 small countries of which 25 are less 
developed countries (LDCs) while eight are middle-income countries. Table 1 lists the 
sample of countries. 
However, due to data limitations, mainly missing information on aid flows and 
questionable national accounts data, we were only able to include 22 of the 33 countries 
in the econometric analysis below.8 The eleven omitted countries are identified with  
 
                                                 
7   Interestingly, the definition of ‘small’ appears to have decreased over the years. Starting with Kuznets 
(1960), he defines small states as countries with less than ten million people. Today, this definition 
would classify some 134 economies as small. Another definition is given by Armstrong et al. (1998), 
who define ‘micro-states’ as countries with less than three million people; a definition which still 
incorporates a lot of countries. More recently, Kose and Prasad (2002) define small states as having 
less than 1.5 million people in 2002 and microstates as having 40,000 or less. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat uses the same definition although they also include Jamaica, Lesotho, Namibia and Papua 
New Guinea, despite the fact that several of these countries have reasonably large populations. 
Moving further down in population size, Easterly and Kraay (2000) define small states as having an 
average population over the period 1960-95 of less than one million and the World Bank uses supra-
normal income per capita cutoff levels to give special access to IDA credits for small island countries. 
At present, nine countries benefit from this exception: Cape Verde, Dominica, Grenada, Maldives, 
Samoa, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Tonga and Vanuatu. 
8  The questionable national-accounts data refer to seven countries for which the real growth rates in 
some—or all—expenditure components equal the growth rate in real GDP in a very large fraction of  
7 
Table 1 
Categorizing small developing countries 
Small developing countries 
Micro island states    Small island states    Non-island states 
Small middle-income 
countries 
          
Antigua and Barbuda (a    Cape Verde    Djibouti  St Lucia
 (b 
Dominica   Comoros    Equatorial  Guinea
 (b French  Polynesia 
Grenada
 (b   Fiji
 (b   Gabon
 (b Aruba  (a 
Seychelles   Mauritius
 (b    The Gambia  Cayman Islands (a 
St Kitts & Nevis
 (b    Sao Tome & Principe    Guinea-Bissau  Marshall Islands (a 
Tonga   Solomon  Islands  (a   Guyana
 (b Palau  (a 
Kiribati (a    St Vincent & the Grenadines Suriname
 (b Netherlands  Antilles  (a 
    Vanuatu    Togo  Trinidad & Tobago (a 
   Maldives  (a      
   Samoa  (a      
Notes:   ‘Small’ is defined as having a population of less than one million in 1980. ‘Developing’ is defined 
as a having a mean income of US$5,000 in 1980, as measured in 1990 dollars. Larger per capita 
incomes qualify countries in the right-hand side column as middle income. The small middle-
income countries are not included in the analysis in section 2. Countries marked with (a are not 
included in the econometric analysis in section 4. Countries marked by (b are included in the full 
econometric sample of 22 countries, but are defined as non aid-dependent because they are 
either mineral-rich or have significant financial services sectors. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
an ‘(a’ in Table 1. For the remaining countries, the full sample from 1972 to 2003 is 
rarely available. Thus, in total we have an unbalanced panel of 22 countries with a total 
of 660 observations. Summary statistics are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
Since our study selectively uses cross-country data it also behooves to identify how 
these SDCs differ from larger LDCs, and also to identify key differences among SDCs. 
In fact, these between- and within-sample differences turn out to be crucial to our 
derivation and interpretation of key results. 
In terms of differences between SDCs and larger LDCs, there is a large body of 
literature discussing the distinctive economic, biophysical, and sociopolitical 
characteristics of small developing countries and small island developing states. These 
differences are analysed in detail in Appendix B. From the existing literature we 
identified five key stylized facts on SDCs which at least partially distinguish them from 
larger developing countries. We then reexamined these stylized facts in considerable 
detail, including formal statistical tests (Appendix Table B2). In doing so we found that 
there are sufficient empirical grounds for concluding that SDCs generally have: 
i)  Higher standards of living, better institutions and (mostly) better policies than 
LDCs; 
ii)  Greater openness in terms of trade (but less diversity in export structures), 
financial flows and labour flows; 
                                                                                                                                               
the sample years. The most extreme example is Kiribati where all the national income accounts 
components have identical growth rates from 1971 to 2003. 8 
iii)  Somewhat distinctive geographical disadvantages, including isolation and high 
transport costs, as well as more vulnerability to natural disasters;9 
iv)  Greater volatility of output, but not necessarily of exports; and 
v)  A larger size and role of government expenditure and foreign aid, doubtlessly 
related to SDCs’ dependence on undiversified and quite volatile domestic 
production (Rodrik 1998). 
All these factors are relevant to our study. We have already made note of the importance 
of policies, institutions and openness in influencing macroeconomic adjustment. Natural 
disasters and other exogenous shocks (e.g., terms of trade shocks) may also be 
important insofar as they may simultaneously determine aid flows and other 
macroeconomic outcomes. Section 2 also noted that the volatility of exports and output 
may influence decisions as to whether FEX aid should be converted to local currency or 
held as precautionary FEX reserves. And finally, the great importance of aid and 
government expenditure in SDCs could yield important insights into how economies 
with ‘scaled up’ aid receipts are likely to use that aid in the short run. 
There is, however, a danger in presuming that SDCs constitute an extremely 
homogenous group of economies. We therefore also explored significant within-sample 
differences among SDCs. In particular, the literature on SDCs often distinguishes 
between non-island and island small states, between small states and micro states (say, 
of less than 250,000 inhabitants), and between generally wealthier SDCs with 
significant nonagricultural sectors (mining, tourism, financial services) and those which, 
bereft of these resources, are largely dependent upon foreign aid, remittances and non-
mineral primary exports.  
Although Appendix B verifies some important differences between subgroups of our 
SDCs,10 we will argue that this last difference—that of differences in economic 
structure and aid dependence—is quite probably the largest and most relevant 
divergence within the present sample of SDCs. Importantly, this diversity could 
confound our econometric results because variation in aid responses could be 
significantly influenced by heterogeneity in economic structure and aid dependence, 
making meaningful inference difficult if not impossible. So in addition to defining a 
sample of SDCs, we also define two mutually exclusive subsamples. The first 
subsample consists of countries which we define as non aid-dependent because their 
economies are possessive of substantial mineral and/or financial services sectors: 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are oil/petroleum producers; Fiji, Guyana and Suriname 
are mineral rich; and four of our SDCs have significant financial centres (Grenada,  
St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia and Mauritius).11 These economies are marked with a ‘(b’ 
                                                 
9  It is not entirely clear that SDCs on average are more disadvantaged geographically that other LDCs. 
For one thing, many SDCs are coastal, and some are advantageously located near large economies. 
Many have fairly predictable weather patterns and fertile soil, and most seem to be less vulnerable to 
tropical diseases.  
10  In particular, we often found substantial differences between island states and small non-island states, 
but rarely did we note significant differences between micro island states and other island states. So 
economic structure and aid dependence arguably identify the largest and most relevant divergence 
among the present sample of SDCs. 
11  This financial services classification is based on information from the World Factbook published by 
the CIA (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).   
9 
in Table 1. The remaining thirteen countries define the second group of aid-dependent 
countries.12 The idea is that the thirteen countries in the second group should have more 
similar aid-response profiles compared to the full sample.  
3.2  A simple econometric model of absorption and spending 
In this subsection we formulate a simple econometric model which we use to estimate 
the short-run absorption and spending impact of a ‘sudden increase’ in foreign aid. 
Since the effect of changes in aid receipts on the macroeconomy is likely to be 
distributed across several years, the empirical model must be dynamic. A simple 
dynamic model that does not impose too much a priori structure is a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model. We, therefore, formulate a VAR model for the main 
macroeconomic aggregates and foreign aid. 
The starting point is the national income accounts identity measured in constant local 
currency units: 
, =+ +− + jt jt jt jt jt jt YCIXMR  (1) 
where Yjt is GDP in country j at time t, Cjt is total consumption (the sum of household 
consumption and government consumption), Ijt is gross fixed capital formation, Xjt is 
exports of goods and services, Mjt is imports of goods and services while Rjt is inventory 
investment. 
As explained in section 2, the text-book response to an increase in foreign aid can be 
interpreted as an equal increase in net imports (Mjt – Xjt) and domestic demand (Cjt + Ijt), 
leaving the GDP unchanged in the short-run. In the econometric analysis we therefore 
relate absorption to the change in net imports relative to the aid inflow while spending is 
related to the change in domestic demand relative to the change in the aid flow. 
In order to remove trends and to get ‘standardized’ measures across countries we move 
from the income identity to the national accounts growth identity by subtraction and 
subsequently division by GDP, lagged one year. Hence, we look at the growth rate in 
real GDP from year t-1 to t and the growth contributions from the terms on the right 
hand side of the identity: 
, =+ +− + jt jt jt jt jt jt y cixmr  (2) 
where: 
                                                 
12  Note that aid dependent is used in a fairly specific way here. Some of the countries in the subsample 
of mineral-rich economies with significant financial services still receive large amounts of aid, but we 
have not defined them as aid dependent because they have access to significantly large non-aid 
sources of foreign exchange and government. Nevertheless, We note that although we have not 
explicitly used aid/GDP ratios to define these subsample, the difference in aid/GDP ratios for these 
two groups is considerable over the time frame of our analysis (1973-2001): around 7 per cent of GDP 
in the case of the non-aid-dependent sample, and around 22 per cent of GDP in the case of the aid-
dependent sample. Also, some readers may object to the phrase ‘dependent’. We do not intend it to be 
derogatory in any way.  10 
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For foreign aid we look at the net inflows of aid (grants plus loans minus loan 
repayments) less emergency aid and technical cooperation. The aid inflow is measured 
analogously to the growth contributions in equation (2); i.e., we model the change in aid 














To accommodate the possibly diverse short- and medium-run impacts of aid inflows 
across countries we formulate country specific VAR models. The relatively small 
samples for each of the countries—we have annual observations broadly spanning the 
period 1972-2003—poses restrictions on the dimension of the VAR models. We 
therefore aggregate the growth contributions from consumption and fixed capital 
formation to get the growth contribution from domestic demand, djt: 
=+ jt jt jt dci  (5) 
Moreover, as the growth accounting is an identity, we leave out one of the components 
from the VAR. Ideally, we would have liked to omit only inventory investment from the 
model; however, some countries in our sample have zero inventory investments in 
several years (i.e., the national income accounts identity holds for GDP, consumption, 
fixed capital formation, exports and imports). Therefore, we omit both inventory 
investment and imports from the VAR models.13 The resulting VAR models thus 
include aid, real GDP growth and the growth contributions from domestic demand and 
exports, i.e., we consider the 4 x 1 vector  ( , , , )′ = jt jt jt jt jt Z aydx . In addition to these 
four endogenous variables, we control for the impact of natural disasters, Wjt, measured 
by the number of people per 100 who are affected by natural disasters each year.14 The 
main reason for controlling for natural disasters is that aid flows to a disaster struck 
country may respond within-year to such exogenous events. 




=+ + + ∑∑
pq
jt j jk jt k jl jt l jt
kl
Z AZ BW u (6) 
 
where μj is a vector of country specific intercept terms, , 1, = … jk Ak p and Bjl, l = 0,…,q, 
are country specific coefficient matrices, and ujt is a zero mean innovation process with 
() ′ =Ω jt jt j Euu  and  ( ) 0 ′ = jt js Euu  for ts ≠ . 
                                                 
13  The adding-up constraint implies that we are still analyzing the impact of aid flows on the sum of 
imports and inventory investment. 
14  Natural disasters cover drought; earthquakes; epidemics; extreme temperatures; famine; floods; insect 
infestations; slides; volcanos; wave surges; wild fires; wind storms. Data are from The OFDA/CRED 
International Disaster Database (available at: www.em-dat.net) Université Catholique de Louvain, 
Brussels, Belgium.  
11 
The coefficient matrices, intercept terms and covariance matrices are estimated country-
by-country, and subsequently, following the suggestion in Pesaran and Smith (1995), 
average parameters are estimated using the mean group estimator. Specifically:  
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where the hat-notation indicates estimators, and the number of countries is N, which 
may refer in this case to either the total sample, or a particular subsample of aid-
dependent or non aid-dependent countries. 
The mean group estimates are subsequently used to estimate average impulse response 
function parameters.15 First, the mean group moving average parameters are estimated 
using the recursions: 
1






Φ= Φ = ∞ ∑ …
 (9) 
starting with  04 ˆ Φ= I and setting  ˆ 0f o r . => k A kp  Next the impulse response parameters 
are estimated by: 
ˆˆ ˆ , hh P Θ= Φ  (10) 
Where  ˆ P   is a Choleski decomposition of the average covariance matrix of the 
innovations such that  ˆˆ ˆ. ′ =Ω PP  
We also estimate the average responses for the sum of imports and inventory investment 
(henceforth this is just referred to as imports). Because of the adding-up constraint, the 
response in the growth rate in real GDP per capita must equal the sum of the responses 
in the growth contributions, including imports. Hence, the responses in net  imports 
(imports minus exports) can be estimated by: 
ˆ ˆ , [0, 1,1, 0], hh HH θ =Θ = −  (11) 
when the ordering of the variables in the VAR-model is ( , , , )′ = jt jt jt jt jt Z aydx .  
The average impulse response functions in (10) and (11), in particular the responses to 
aid shocks, are the parameters of interest when we evaluate the dynamic impact of aid 
on the macroeconomic variables in the system in section 5. 
Approximate measures of absorption and spending can also be estimated from the 
impulse response parameters. Absorption (over time) can be defined as the accumulated 
                                                 
15 The derivations in the following only differ from the standard because we are using mean group 
estimators of the autoregressive parameters to estimate the impulse response function parameters. See 
e.g., Lütkepohl (1991) or Hamilton (1994) for text-book treatments of the standard VAR model.  12 
change in net imports relative to the accumulated change in the aid inflow following an 
aid shock: 
11 1
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where u1,t is the shock to aid and ei is the i-th column of I4. Hence at any given time, s, 
after the aid shock we look at the fraction of aid that has been absorbed. 
Spending of the aid flow over time can be defined analogously as the accumulated 
change in domestic demand relative to the accumulated change in the aid flow following 
an aid shock: 
31 11
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′′ == Θ Θ = ∞ ∑∑∑∑ …  (13) 
When s = ∞ we get the total absorption and spending of the aid flow following a 
sudden increase in aid. 
The Choleski decomposition implies a causal ordering of the variables in the VAR-
model. As the model is based on an accounting identity there is little guidance from 
economic theory when it comes to specifying the causal chain. Therefore, we can only 
give heuristic arguments for our preferred structure. 
The decision to omit imports from the VAR is the first step in the ‘structural’ ordering 
of the variables. Imports are chosen to be the omitted variable because we assume the 
contemporaneous causation runs from the four variables included in the model to 
imports. For the other variables in the model we use the following causal ordering: 
() . →→→ →+ jt jt jt jt jt jt axdy m r  (14) 
Hence, we assume aid is predetermined such that innovations in aid are ‘structural’ aid 
shocks. This assumption is the main reason for subtracting emergency aid from the net 
aid flows, because that kind of aid may respond to within-year changes in the 
macroeconomic variables. However, in the model, we assume that other aid flows are 
results of negotiations running prior to the actual disbursements in a given year.  
The ordering within the national accounts identity is mainly governed by the 
observation that the countries in our sample are small open economies. Hence, we 
assume shocks to the growth contribution from exports are mainly external events 
driven by changes in world market prices. As most of the countries in the sample have 
fixed exchange rates this makes export shocks independent of current events in the 
growth contribution from domestic demand and from the growth rate in GDP. The 
growth contribution from domestic demand is the third variable in the chain because 
this variable includes government consumption and investment and, in the model, 
discretionary fiscal policy changes can be considered as consumption shocks or 
investment shocks. Finally, the growth rate in GDP is last in the VAR ordering but, as it 
precedes imports and inventory investment, the goods market is assumed to be cleared 
by changes in the latter two variables, not by GDP. 
The VAR model is mainly formulated to analyse the short- and medium-run impact of 
aid flows, therefore our specific choice of structural ordering should not be interpreted 
(12)  
13 
as an attempt to provide a strict identification of structural shocks. The key assumption 
above is that aid flows are predetermined, whereby the innovations in the aid equation 
can be interpreted as aid shocks to the economies in question. 
4 Empirical  results 
In this section we present the econometric results based on the model discussed above. 
The focus is on the impulse response functions rather than on the autoregressive 
parameters, which are reported in the Appendix. And as noted above, we will present 
full sample results as well as results for the two subsamples. 
Impulse responses to a one percentage point shock to aid are based on mean group 
estimates of VAR models with three lags (see Table A2 in the Appendix).16 These 
estimates are shown in Figure 2 along with pointwise 95 per cent posterior probability 
bands.17 The Figure shows the responses in aid, the growth contributions from domestic 
demand (d = c + i) and net imports (m - x), and the real growth rate in GDP. 
The first thing to note in Figure 2 is that shocks to aid are followed by significantly 
decreased aid flows the succeeding years. This confirms the often found result that aid 
flows are quite volatile (Bulir and Hamann 2003; Lensink and Morrisey 2000; Pallage 
and Robe 2001), a situation which suggests that policymakers in the aid-receiving 
countries should not regard ‘sudden’ increases in the aid flows as permanent (Foster and 
Killick 2005; Heller and Gupta 2002; IMF 2005). The results in Figure 2 indicate that 
only about two-thirds of the initial change is a permanent change in the level of aid. As 
noted in section 2, a reasonable response to this ‘reversion’ tendency in aid flows would 
be to delay and smooth the absorption and spending of sudden changes in aid. Such a 
delay is consistent with Figure 2 as we find no significant changes in any of the growth 
contributions or in the growth rate in real GDP in the initial year of the aid shock (t=0). 
The responses in the GDP growth rate are, in general, well determined. While there is 
no initial response, there is a fairly large response in the growth rate (a 0.37 percentage 
point increase) the first year after the initial shock. The first year response is followed 
by cyclical movements with alternating positive and negative responses, but these are all 
small compared to the first year response. 
The responses in net imports and domestic demand are both imprecisely determined. 
The point estimates show negative effects on net imports in the first year after the aid 
shock followed by positive responses in year two and three. The positive response in the 
3rd year is marginally significant and fairly large (0.23 percentage points). For domestic 
demand the responses are positive and relatively large (but insignificant) in the three 
first years following the aid shock. 
                                                 
16  A one percentage point shock to aid is about four times the average value of the aid variable across all 
countries and periods, see Table A1. But the standard error of the aid residuals in Table A2 indicates 
that this is close to a one standard error shock. 
17 When reporting results for the impulse response parameters, we follow the suggestion in Sims and 
Zha (1999) and report approximate error bands based on a Bayesian posterior probability distribution 
in which we condition on the initial observations and use a flat-prior. The posterior probability 
distribution is estimated using Monte Carlo Integration based on 10,000 Monte Carlo draws. 14 
Figure 2 

































































































Note:   The dashed lines indicate 95 per cent pointwise probability bands. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
Figure 3 








































































































Note:   The dashed lines indicate 95 per cent pointwise probability bands. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
 
The poorly determined responses in net imports and domestic demand are a result of 
averaging over countries with very different aid-response profiles. Many growth studies 
omit oil producers and countries relying on mining industries, as well as countries with  
15 
other peculiar economic structures, such as large financial services sectors. As 
mentioned, our sample includes nine countries with such characteristics. In order to get 
a more homogenous group of countries we single out these nine countries (denoted ‘non 
aid-dependent’) while the remainder thirteen countries are gathered in another group 
(denoted ‘aid dependent’). The idea is that the thirteen countries in the second group 
should have more similar aid-response profiles compared to the full sample. For the 
sake of completeness we report the impulse response results for both groups, even 
though non aid-dependent countries should not be considered as a homogenous group of 
countries. The regression results for the subsamples based on the aid dependence 
classification are reported in Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix and the impulse 
response functions are given in Figures 3 and 4. 
Figures 3 and 4 reveal two sets of very different responses to aid shocks for non aid-
dependent and aid-dependent countries. One common response, though, is that the 
initial change in the aid flow is followed by a significant decrease the next year. 
The response functions for the non aid-dependent group are fairly similar to the results 
for the whole sample as the responses in net imports and domestic demand are poorly 
determined while there is a large positive response in the growth rate the first year after 
the shock (Figure 3). The large negative responses in the first two years in net imports 
can be attributed to large positive responses in exports, which also account for the 
positive response in the GDP growth rate in year 1. Hence, the responses to aid shocks 
for this group of countries do not correspond in any systematic way to the absorption 
and spending framework set out in section 2. 
For the thirteen aid-dependent countries, the picture is different (Figure 4). While there 
is no significant initial response to the aid shock, there are increases in both net imports 
and domestic demand in the following two years. Moreover, there is a strong cyclical 
pattern as the responses in the two growth contribution components turn negative in the 
3rd and 4th year after the shock, subsequently reverting to positive responses later on 
(year 6). In general the responses in domestic demand are larger in absolute terms than 
the responses in net imports, leading to a positive impact on GDP growth in year 2 
followed by smaller negative responses in the 3rd and 4th year. Yet, overall the short-
run responses in the GDP growth rates are modest. 
Next, we turn to estimates of absorption and spending, as they are defined in equations 
(12) and (13), i.e., absorption is the accumulated change in net imports relative to the 
accumulated change in aid following an aid shock, whilst spending is the accumulated 
change in domestic demand relative to the accumulated change in aid following an aid 
shock. Table 2 reports estimates of the total absorption and spending (s = ∞) for the 
different country groupings used in the impulse response analyses. 
Average absorption for all 22 countries as a group is low (suggesting that the average 
real resource transfer is much lower than the aid transfer), while average spending is 
much larger than average absorption, which in principle suggests short-run demand 
pressures could be a problem in these economies. The results for the non aid-dependent 
economies are even more anomalous, with negative absorption and spending point 
estimates. The large standard errors in samples which include these states suggest that 
we should not attach too much importance to the resulting point estimates, however. 
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Figure 4 

































































































Note:   The dashed lines indicate 95 per cent pointwise probability bands. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
 
Table 2 
Estimated total absorption and spending 
 Absorption  Spending 
    












Note:   Standard errors in parentheses. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
But much more encouragingly, confining the results to SDCs without significant mining 
and financial services sectors yields much more significant and interpretable results. For 
these aid-dependent states, we find that about half of the aid flow is absorbed while 
some 80 per cent is spent. Hence, even though there is absorption, these countries seem 
to break the ‘golden rule’ of absorption and spending. Yet, our finding of an average 
absorption rate around 50 per cent is much higher than was found in most of the 
countries examined in the 2005 IMF report and in Foster and Killick (2005). 
Doubtlessly these differences are due to differences in the sample of countries, the 
timeframes of the analyses and differences in methodology. 
The impulse response functions in Figure 4 also illustrate that it is very difficult to infer 
the absorption and spending rates from case studies, even if all exogenous factors are  
17 
taken into account. The problem arises because the aid shock itself initiates a business-
cycle kind of response, possibly caused by the excess spending relative to absorption. 
This means that spending and absorption vary over time. To illustrate the importance of 
time in the estimation of average absorption and spending behaviour, we plot the point 
estimates of absorption and spending as a function of time in Figure 5. While the long-
run absorption of the aid shock is only 50 per cent, more than 100 per cent of the 
additional aid inflow is absorbed in year 2 after the shock. Likewise, in year 2 the 
accumulated spending is almost twice the accumulated aid flow (170 per cent). These 
peak responses subsequently taper off because of decreases in net imports and domestic 
demand and in year 8 after the initial shock, the accumulated effects are close to the 
long-run estimates. 
These time patterns demonstrate the difficulties in quantifying absorption and spending 
from case studies because differences in outcomes from different cases may simply be due 
to differences in the timespan covered in the studies. Furthermore, the time patterns 
illustrate possible problems in the absorption and spending concepts because one could 
argue that the 3-year horizon is more relevant than the infinite horizon as the decrease in 
absorption from year 3 onwards could well be a result of ‘mismanagement’ of the 
additional aid flow causing a decrease in net imports and domestic demand. Further 
consideration of this problem is obviously beyond the scope of the present paper, but 
sensitivity to the timespan of the analysis is an issue that clearly deserves greater 
consideration in this literature, and is therefore a useful by-product of the present 
analysis. 
Figure 5 































































Note:   The dynamic absorption and spending estimators are defined in equations (12) and (13). The 
dashed lines indicate 95 per cent pointwise probability bands. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 18 
We conclude our results section by attempting to go one step further in our analysis of 
the macroeconomic behaviour of our aid-dependent states. One ambiguity in the results 
for these thirteen economies is that because these SDCs are supra-open economies, the 
fairly large absorption of an additional aid flow may simply be a result of very high 
marginal import/demand ratios and not a result of a proactive aid-absorption policy. To 
look into this issue further, we compare the accumulated response in net imports relative 
to the accumulated response in domestic demand for when the thirteen aid-dependent 
economies respond to an aid shock as opposed to a domestic demand shock 
(Figure 6).18  
Figure 6 reveals that the short-run marginal net import-domestic demand ratio is higher 
when the economies respond to an aid shock as compared to a domestic demand shock 
for at least the first 3 years following a shock (which is probably the most important 
timespan to consider). Whilst not conclusive evidence given the sensitivity to the time 
frame of the analysis and the stochastic nature of the estimates, Figure 6 is supportive of 
the conclusion that the thirteen aid-dependent SDCs do pursue somewhat proactive 
short-run aid absorption policies.     
Figure 6 
Marginal ratios of net imports to domestic demand following a 1 percentage point shock 

















































Note:   The marginal ratios are estimated as the accumulated responses in net imports divided by the 
accumulated responses in domestic demand following a 1 percentage point aid shock and a  
1 percentage demand shock, respectively. The dashed lines in the lower plot indicate 95 per 
cent pointwise probability bands. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
                                                 
18  Among other things, the domestic demand shock can be interpreted as a result of a fiscal expansion.  
19 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we developed a simple vector autoregressive model describing the 
short-run responses to sudden aid shocks in the national accounts growth identity 
components. The aim of this approach was to describe macroeconomic responses to aid 
shocks in a manner that was relatively unrestricted by a priori theorizing. We therefore 
think of this approach as an econometric complement to the recent case studies 
describing short-run responses to aid surges in selected African countries (Foster and 
Killick 2005; IMF 2005). 
Whilst the novelty of our approach—as well as justified concerns over data quality—
warrants considerable caution in drawing overly strong inferences from the econometric 
analysis presented above, our results point to some reasonably clear conclusions. First, 
aid flows to SDCs are indeed highly volatile and, one may infer, unpredictable. This 
reemphasizes the importance of ‘aid smoothing’ in aid-dependent countries. Second, 
whilst our sample of SDCs is clearly homogenous relative to other developing 
countries, there is fairly clear evidence that this group of SDCs has still reacted quite 
diversely to changes in aid flows, apparently because of diversity in their degree of aid 
dependency. And third, we have inferred that in the highly aid-dependent countries most 
aid is both absorbed and spent. Although this is a generally positive outcome—for 
absorption rates in these thirteen countries are high on average relative to the countries 
examined in previous research—these aid-dependent SDCs still appear to spend 
significantly more than they absorb, which may lead to short-run macroeconomic 
imbalances. 
We have also pointed to some methodological problems in evaluating the degree to 
which the countries absorb and spend an increased aid inflow. In the very short run, i.e., 
1 to 3 years after the initial aid shock, the aid-dependent countries, on average, absorb 
and spend more than the accumulated additional aid flow. This leads to reversals in net 
imports and domestic demand over time whereby the medium-term absorption and 
spending rates drop relative to the short-run rates. This implies that estimates of 
absorption and spending must refer explicitly to a given time horizon. This is an issue 
that has not yet been adequately dealt with in the existing literature, and is therefore an 
important methodological lesson of our research. 
Finally, we have indicated a way to evaluate whether aid recipients actively seek to 
absorb aid flows in the short run. For the aid-dependent countries we found indications 
of a proactive aid absorption policy, namely higher observed marginal import-domestic 
demand ratios for aid shocks than for domestic demand shocks (at least, in the short 
run). However, further research is needed to refine this line of analysis. 
As for future research, this could usefully experiment with modifications to the 
empirical approach adopted herein. Whilst the VAR approach is largely atheoretical, we 
were required to impose a priori restrictions on the causal ordering of the variables in 
the VAR-model without much formal theoretical guidance. Arguably the key 
assumption of this ordering was that aid was predetermined with respect to the other 
variables. This assumption can be challenged. For example, in very small economies 
that are highly dependent upon imports, donors may react to any factor which threatens 
the import capacity of the country (e.g., export shocks). There are also different ways in 
which one might define subsamples or average across them, and future investigations in 20 
this area would do well to identify the robustness of alternative assumptions in this 
regard. 
There are other aspects of our approach which can potentially be improved upon, 
although many of these deficiencies are common to most, if not all, macroeconomic 
regressions. Whilst our estimation procedure is relatively unrestrictive in that we have 
allowed the parameters to vary across countries, we have nevertheless assumed that they 
are constant over time. This assumption could be problematic if, for example, aid 
management has improved over time.19 Also, the aid measure (ODA) is very noisy and 
this creates problems in dynamic analyses of annual data (i.e., measurement error 
problems). And finally, our ability to control for all the relevant factors in a 
macroeconomy is inherently limited, although in this respect our results are no different 
from other macroeconometric analyses. Indeed, even the more detailed case studies in 
this literature have struggled to ‘isolate’ aid shocks (Foster and Killick 2005). 
These caveats aside, the approach formulated herein still constitutes a useful first 
attempt at measuring the absorption and spending responses to aid using flexible 
econometric techniques. And as with any new approach, the methods and the models 
employed can doubtlessly be improved and refined so as to provide a very useful and 
more formal complement to the case study type approach which has characterized the 
literature thus far.  
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Appendix I  Summary statistics and mean group regression results 
Appendix Table A1 
Summary statistics for the countries in the econometric analysis. 
   Mean  Std dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
  
  All (22 countries, 660 observations) 
Aid 0.25  7.97  -70.46  67.65 
GDP growth  3.64  7.44  -28.00  95.28 
Domestic demand  5.27  19.98 -109.75  302.47 
Net imports  1.86  17.70  -130.66  268.02 
Exports 1.77  11.44  -80.73  123.10 
Imports 3.63  22.08  -145.66  322.61 
  
  Non aid-dependent (9 countries, 279 observations) 
Aid -0.03  4.25  -23.48  29.36 
GDP growth  3.92  9.21  -27.50  95.28 
Domestic demand  6.77  28.25 -109.75  302.47 
Net imports  3.46  24.99  -130.66  268.02 
Exports 2.50  15.08  -62.26  123.10 
Imports 5.96  30.95  -106.37  322.61 
  
  Aid-dependent (13 countries, 381 observations) 
Aid 0.45  9.85  -70.46  67.65 
GDP growth  3.44  5.81  -28.00  43.70 
Domestic demand  4.16 10.27  -53.84 52.59 
Net imports  0.68  9.13  -64.93  40.11 
Exports 1.24  7.74 -80.73  35.52 
Imports  1.92 11.75  -145.66 46.18 
Note:   The summary statistics are for the variables in the VAR analysis. Domestic demand, net imports, 
exports and imports are the growth contributions as defined in equation (2) while the aid variable 
is defined in equation (4). The growth contribution and the aid variables are measured as 
percentage points. GDP growth is per cent. 24 
Appendix Table A2 
The mean group VAR model parameter estimates for all 22 SDCs 
   Aid  Exports 
Domestic 
demand GDP 
      
































































































































      
Standard  error    1.151 1.491 3.032 0.774 
Residual correlations 
Aid 1.000  0.038  -0.010  0.036 
Export  0.038 1.000 0.128  0.323 
Domestic demand  -0.010 0.128 1.000  0.302 
GDP  0.036 0.323 0.302  1.000 
Countries/observations  22/588          
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Appendix Table A3 
The mean group VAR model parameter estimates for the 9 non aid-dependent states 
   Aid  Exports 
Domestic 
demand GDP 

















































































































































      
Standard  error  0.868 2.990 7.016 1.524 
Residual correlations 
Aid  1.000 0.138 -0.099 0.048 
Exports  0.138 1.000  0.078 0.388 
Domestic demand  -0.099 0.078  1.000 0.287 
GDP  0.048 0.388  0.287 1.000 
Countries/observations  9/252          
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Appendix Table A4 
The mean group VAR model parameter estimates for the 13 aid-dependent states 
   Aid  Exports 
Domestic 
demand GDP 
      
































































































































      
Standard  error  1.852 1.444 1.653 0.776 
Residual correlations 
Aid 1.000  0.006  0.062  0.042 
Exports 0.006  1.000  0.365  0.198 
Domestic demand  0.062 0.365  1.000 0.433 
GDP 0.042  0.198  0.433  1.000 
Countries/observations  13/336          
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Appendix II: Differences between SDCs and other LDCs 
II.1 Existing views on the special features of SDCs 
There is a large body of literature discussing the distinctive economic, biophysical, and 
sociopolitical characteristics of small developing countries and small island developing 
states (SIDS).20 These stylized facts on SDCs, including SIDS, can be expressed as five 
broad features which, at least partially, distinguish them from larger developing 
countries. 
1  Higher standards of living, better institutions and (mostly) better policies 
The incomes of small states are generally much higher than other LDCs (Easterly 
and Kraay 2000),21 but do show considerable variation. Moreover, most studies find 
that small developing countries perform better than other developing countries in 
terms of per capita output growth as well as health and education measures, albeit 
with some variation. 
The reasons for the relatively good socioeconomic performance of SDCs are 
typically thought to be twofold (Read 2001). First, SDCs have apparent 
disadvantages which could work to their advantage in the long run. For example, 
SDCs have an inherent vulnerability to, and dependence upon, the world economy, 
which is thought to impose the discipline of competition on domestic markets, and to 
pressure policymakers into adopting internationally acceptable policies and 
institutional structures. Better policies may also include a greater emphasis on 
strategic specialization, in the manner envisaged by strategic trade theorists and 
institutionalists (Hausman and Rodrik 2003; Rodrik 2005).22 The better policy and 
institutional environment could mean that despite their apparent diseconomies of 
scale, small states actually have higher productivity growth and investment levels 
than other LDCs (Easterly and Kraay 2000). Also, their lack of political and 
economic importance on the international stage could mean that larger countries do 
not view them as economically threatening, and may even see SDCs as a 
cost-effective means of acquiring support in UN voting decisions (Bertram 1993). 
Thus, powerful countries may be more inclined to offer SDCs more favourable 
conditions on trade, offshore finance laws, migration and foreign aid, relative to 
other large LDCs.  
A second explanation of the success of small states may be their greater social, ethnic 
and linguistic homogeneity (Kuznets 1960). Ethnolinguistic homogeneity has been 
shown to be a condition which fosters better policymaking, lower levels of 
                                                 
20    Recent papers that systematically test for differences between small and large states include 
(Armstrong et al. 1998; Armstrong and Read 2002; Bertram 1993; Briguglio 1995; Collier and Dollar 
1999; Easterly and Kraay 2000; Harden 1985; Kose and Prasad 2002; Milner and Westaway 1993; 
Ramkissoon 2002; Read 2001; Streeten 1993; UN 2002). Earlier works generally provide descriptive 
analysis and basic statistics (Kuznets 1960; Scitovsky 1960). 
21    Easterly and Kraay find that small states have per capita incomes 40 per cent higher than other 
countries. 
22   Similar arguments have been made about two highly successful city states, Hong Kong and 
Singapore, as well as other countries in precarious security positions (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, 
Israel and its neighbours). 28 
corruption and less conflict (Alesina et al. 2003; Easterly and Levine 1997). Whilst 
this explanation has some attraction at a general level, SDCs are not all characterized 
by ethnolinguistic homogeneity. Many SDCs are characterized by tribal and clan 
allegiances, and non-indigenous populations account for large portions of the total 
population in many countries. So whilst the degree of ethnic homogeneity and the 
quality of policies and institutions may partially explain the better than average 
performance of SDCs relative to larger developing countries, they probably also 
largely explain variation in economic performance among SDCs. Also, Easterly and 
Kraay (2000) find no substantial differences in the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, 
albeit with rather limited data. 
2  Greater openness 
Small states are generally more open (i.e., trade/GDP ratios), but demonstrate less 
diversity in trade structures than larger economies, partly because of a narrow 
resource base and sub-optimal scales of production. The largest export product in 
many small states accounts for over 50 per cent of total export earnings, and since 
much of formal production is exported, these economies are highly dependent upon 
imports to diversify their consumption and fund investment. Some small economies 
are also more open to international financial flows, and several have established 
themselves as offshore financial centres. Others are open in the sense that they export 
labour to other countries and in return receive large amounts of workers’ remittances.  
3  A larger size and role of government expenditure and foreign aid  
Small states have inherently limited domestic competition, which could reduce 
efficiency in the non-traded sector and partially explain the large size of the 
government sector in these economies as the prevalence of natural monopolies may 
be greater than normal. Governments may also be larger because of the higher levels 
of foreign aid which these countries receive. And finally, the greater volatility of 
output may imply a greater role for government as a provider of de facto insurance. 
Rodrik (1998) for example, argues that this type of role explains why more open 
economies typically have bigger governments. 
4  Greater volatility of output  
Despite their higher average output growth, SDCs typically suffer from much higher 
volatility of output. Output volatility is chiefly related to four factors. First, volatility 
may result from their lack of diversification in the goods market, most of which is 
exported, and therefore subject to the vagaries of international export prices. Second, 
many small states, and islands states in particular, are highly vulnerable in an 
environmental sense. Chiefly they suffer from biophysical shocks such as 
cyclones/hurricanes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, but also from 
droughts, floods and mudslides. Third, it is sometimes claimed that small economies 
have insufficient international financial links by which to buffer shocks through 
insurance and hedging. Easterly and Kraay (2000) find that restrictions of capital 
inflows are unusually high in microstates, although raw measures of capital inflows 
are actually somewhat larger than average. Thus financial underdevelopment could 
potentially be viewed as a secondary cause of greater output volatility in SDCs.  
A third factor is the tendency in these economies to adopt fixed rather than floating 
exchange rates. In general there is little competition in foreign exchange markets and  
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the banking sector, and many SDCs have close links to larger economies who 
constitute a primary source of export earnings. This implies that there are some clear 
benefits to eliminating nominal exchange rate volatility through pegging the national 
currency to a major foreign currency (or set of currencies), but nominal stability 
comes at the cost of a loss of independent monetary policy by which to smooth real 
shocks. Potentially a fourth factor contributing to greater volatility is the alleged 
procyclical distribution of aid flows, which are a major source of financing in SDCs. 
5  Large and special geographical disadvantages 
In addition to their aforementioned vulnerability to natural disasters and their narrow 
natural resource base, SDCs may suffer from a range of other geographical 
disadvantages. Pacific, Indian Ocean and African islands are isolated from major 
economic (OECD) centres. Other islands, such as Kiribati, are archipelagic in nature, 
so that their citizens are effectively isolated from each other. Isolation can greatly 
increase transport costs, create information asymmetries and significantly increase 
the costs of tax collection, which leads some small islands to generate tax revenue 
through second best instruments, such as taxes on imports. Moreover, many islands 
are highly mountainous, making farming difficult, lowering land productivity, and 
increasing the potential for land degradation (FAO 1990). Almost all islands are 
tropical, and thereby prone to tropical diseases which can decrease labour 
productivity, increase morbidity and mortality rates, and cause a range of other 
problems (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1999). 
II.2 Re-examining the differences between SDCs and ‘large’ LDCs 
Table B1 examines a range of development factors across several categories which 
directly or indirectly incorporate the five stylized differences discussed above. We have 
separated countries into five categories. The first three categories break up small states 
(less than one million people in 1980) into micro island states (countries with less than 
100,000 people in 1980), small island states and small non-island states. The last two 
categories compare all small states (the sum of the first three categories) to all large 
LDCs. For each category we report the sample mean of the factor in question, although 
we report medians in one or two instances where the median is very different to the 
mean. Also, we perform z-tests in which we formally compare the mean in each small 
state category to the large LDC mean. Asterixes indicate significance in these two-tailed 
tests at the 10 per cent level. All variables are measured as averages over the years 1970 
to 2003, data permitting. 
1  Levels of living, policies, and institutions (including conflict) 
Income per capita (in constant US dollars) is substantially higher in island states 
compared to small non-island states and other LDCs. Infrastructure levels are also 
generally much higher for island states (especially micro island states) than for small 
non-island states and other LDCs. Island states have much higher life expectancies 
and literacy rates than other small states and other LDCs. Rural population densities 
are also significantly higher than other LDCs for island states, but only marginally 
higher for small non-island states. 
In terms of polices, micro island states and island states have less distorted exchange 
rate regimes, in the sense that black market exchange rates do not diverge from 30 
formal rates. Inflation (GDP deflator) is generally lower in island states than in other 
LDCs (about half as much, but with some variation), but inflation in small non-island 
states is just as high as in other LDCs. Real interest rate volatility does not 
significantly vary across groups. Tax revenue data are virtually unavailable for micro 
island states and small non-island states, but what data there are suggest that small 
island states actually have significantly higher revenue collection than other LDCs. 
This somewhat surprising result is probably a result of sample selection bias, as the 
data availability is likely to be positively correlated with the importance of the 
revenue in the government budget. Hence, we are reluctant to make strong 
conclusions based on the result. There are also insufficient data to comment on fiscal 
balances, although some authors have point to this as a problem in the Pacific region. 
In terms of financial development, island states have about twice as much private 
credit and bank credit provision (relative to GDP) compared to non-island small 
states and other LDCs. This seems contrary to the widely held view that small states 
are insufficiently developed financially, although there may be two reasons why this 
is the case. First, these means may reflect the fact that some small states have 
developed successful offshore financial centres. And second, financial development 
is intimately linked to trade, see Headey (2006) for a review. 
In terms of institutions, we use ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity data updated 
by (Alesina et al. 2003). These data significantly expand the coverage of these 
measures, which were briefly considered by Easterly and Kraay (2000), who 
conclude that ethnic homogeneity is not greater in the limited set of small states for 
which such data existed. With the updated data we find that island states have about 
half as much ethnolinguistic diversity as other LDCs, but the same degree of 
religious diversity, whereas there are no substantial differences for non-island small 
states and large LDCs. Finally, island states are less prone to antigovernment 
demonstrations, riots, assassinations and coups (as captured in the index of political 
instability) and guerrilla warfare than other LDCs and non-island small states.  
2  Economic structure (openness, government expenditure and aid) 
The small states have somewhat larger consumption to GDP ratios than other LDCs, 
essentially because of larger government consumption to GDP ratios (about twice as 
high, on average). Island states also have higher investment ratios, whereas the 
differences for small non-island states are more marginal. Trade ratios are also larger 
than other LDCs, and within the SDC they are larger for island states than non-island 
states. Tourism is much more important in island states in general than in non-island 
small states and other LDCs. Foreign aid to GDP ratios are equally high among the 
groups of small states, and all small states have significantly higher levels of foreign 
aid relative other LDCs. All of these findings are well in keeping with existing 
beliefs on differences in economic structure according to size. 
3  Volatility 
Volatility in GDP per capita growth is highest for non-island small states (some of 
whom are oil producers), and slightly higher for micro island states than for other 
islands. Small states as a whole have more volatile GDP than other LDCs, but not by 
a great margin (and this is true even after excluding two highly volatile, war-torn 
African countries, Liberia and Rwanda). However, small states have less volatile 
exports (as measured by the coefficient of variation of exports in constant US  
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dollars). Micro island states and small island states, however, have higher natural 
disaster incidences than other LDCs, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Island states also have higher rainfall volatility (measured by the coefficient of 
variation of yearly rainfall). These findings are more or less in accord with existing 
beliefs on small states, although we are surprised not to find greater volatility in 
exports, or larger differences in the incidence of natural disasters. 
II.3 Summarizing the special features of SDCs  
At a general level we find substantial differences between our sample of small states 
and large states in most of the ‘factors of development’. However, not all of the findings 
are intuitive or in accordance with a priori expectations and the existing literature on 
small states. In particular, we find that small states tend to have higher levels of 
financial development, much greater ethnolinguistic homogeneity, and less export 
volatility than other LDCs. In other areas findings are more in accordance with existing 
beliefs about these countries: higher consumption and investment levels, larger 
governments and foreign receipts, much higher levels of living, more open economies, 
and generally more peaceful societies with more stable governments. Another important 
point is that we often, but not always, find substantial differences between island states 
and small non-island states, but rarely if ever do we note significant differences between 




Appendix Table B1 
Comparing development factors across small and large states 
    Small state categories         
    ‘Micro’ islands   Other islands  Non-islands    All small states    ‘Large’ LDCs 
Type of factor  Factor indicator  Avg.  Obs  Avg. Obs Avg. Obs    Avg. Obs    Avg. Obs 
                    
Ethnic heterogeneity  0.17* 6  0.24* 12  0.62  9    0.40 21    0.53 84 
Political instability index  0.04* 7  0.05* 15  0.06* 9    0.05* 24    0.30 87  Political 
Instability  Guerrilla warfare  0.01* 7  0.01* 15  0.04* 9    0.02* 24    0.29 87 
                        
Exchange rate distortions  4.1 6  4.5 14  32.7 9    15.5 23    24.1 86 
Inflation
# 
9.2 8  6.1 16  10.9 9    6.9 25    10.8 88 
Real interest rate volatility  6.2 7  6.8 15  3.0 9    5.4 24    6.2 80 
Tax revenue (%GDP)*  23.5* 3  20.9*  7  19.3* 2    20.6* 9    14.4 65 
Policies 
Private credit supply (%GDP)*  38.3* 7  31.7  15  22.9  9    28.4 24    26.3 85 
                        
Investment (%GDP)*  31.6* 8  29.0* 15  25.0  9    27.5* 24    20.8 87 
Govt. consumption (%GDP)  24.5* 8  22.1* 15  22.4* 9    22.2* 24    14.3 85 
ODA (%GDP)  20.4* 8  18.0* 16  18.3* 9    18.1* 25    7.2 87 
Trade (%GDP)  77.5* 8  74.2* 16  80.1* 9    76.3* 25    54.6 86 
Economic 
structure 
Tourism receipts (%exports)  6.5* 2  8.9*  9  6.5  8    7.8* 17    6.0 65 
                        
Rural pop. Density  1834* 8  1473* 16  1365  9    1434* 25    375 87 
Telephone lines per 1000 people*  135.7* 8  93.9*  16  24.7  9    69.0* 25    41.3 88 
Aircraft departures per capita  0.23 5  0.10 13  0.01 6    0.07 19    0.01 79 
Life expectancy*  68.8* 8  66.7* 16  53.0  9    61.8* 25    57.1 88 
Adult literacy*  95.4* 2  87.0*  8  74.8  4    82.9* 12    70.6 80 
Level  
of living  
GDP per capita (US$)
#  3118 8  2522*  16  1659*  9    2212* 25    1322 80 
                        
Growth volatility  5.3 8  4.9 16  7.6*  8    5.8 24    4.6 72 
Natural disaster incidence  3.1 8  2.8 16-  2.4 9    2.7 25    2.4 88 
Rainfall volatility  0.19# 5 0.15  12  0.16  9    0.16 21    0.14 88 
Volatility 
Export volatility  0.32* 7  0.33* 15  0.46  8    0.38* 23    0.51 82 
Notes:   See the Appendix for full definitions of variables. * indicates that the mean for this group was significantly different at the 10% level to the mean for the ‘large LDCs’ 
category, using a two-tailed z-test. # indicates that the median was reported if it was substantially different from the mean. 
Source:  Compiled by the authors. 
 